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FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
several issues dealing with Native Americans between August 31, 1997
and September 1, 1998. The decisions reinforced and delineated Native
American dependence on the states and the federal government.' This
survey will address and analyze Tenth Circuit decisions that reinforced
precedents in the areas of gaming, tribal membership, and Indian trust
lands. Each topic focuses on one central issue: the delicate, and some-
times arbitrary, negotiation of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments and the imperfect sovereignty of the respective Indian nations.
Historically, American Indian law has not incorporated Native
American culture or custom into its precedents.! Indeed, this trend ex-
tends deep into the nineteenth century. As de Tocqueville noted in his
journals during his travels through the United States during the early part
of the century, "the conduct of the United States Americans toward the
natives was inspired by the most chaste affection for legal formalities."3
The United States Supreme Court analyzed this trend in its opinion in
Worcester v. Georgia by discussing the persistent eagerness of the
United States to enter into treaties with Native American tribes and to
impose Anglo-American mores on them Between the American Revo-
lution and the late nineteenth century, Congress used treaties and stat-
utes, often engineered from the white perspective,' to define the relation-
ship of the United States with American Indian tribes.7
During the initial grafting of Anglo-American law onto Native
American cultures, tribes existed as sovereign entities, separate from the
states. The Court in Worcester illustrated this fact by affi-ming the sov-
1. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., The Evolution of Federal Indian Policy Making, in
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 239, 239-56 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985)
[hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY] (illustrating the development of the policy of dependence
through a survey of United States policy). Deloria notes that Native American tribes seem to have
the same degree of sovereignty as small European nations, such as Monaco and Liechtenstein, but
actually remain trapped in "a state of political and economic pupilage." Id. at 239.
2. See Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, American Indian Policy: An Overview of the Legal Complexi-
ties, Controversies, and Dilemmas, SOC. SCI. J., July 1982, at 9, 9, reprinted in Joyotpaul Chaudhuri,
American Indian Policy: An Overview, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note I, at 15, 15.
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 339 (J.P. Meyer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., Harper & Row, 1st Perennial Library ed. 1988) (1835).
4. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557-58.
6. See FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 62 (Ren-
nard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
7. Cf., e.g., id. at 62--64 (discussing the making of Indian treaties through the United States
system).
8. Cf. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
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ereignty of the Cherokee Nation and emphasizing that the state of Geor-
gia had no jurisdiction over the Nation itself nor the individual members
of the Tribe." The Court had previously held that Native American sover-
eignty was not absolute, as with a foreign nation. Justice Marshall com-
pared the relationship between the United States and Native American
tribes as a trust relationship similar to that of ward and guardian, with the
federal government acting as a benevolent tutor."
American policy toward Native Americans grew more invasive as
the nineteenth century progressed. Initially, Congress intended to act as
a tutor to Native American tribes until the American government be-
lieved that the Indians had adapted well enough to white culture to oper-
ate their own judicial and political institutions." Congress, however,
changed its role in the 1830s with the initiation of the removal policies
that began with the implementation of the campaign promises of Presi-
dent Andrew Jackson.' The Great Removal forcibly removed 60,000
Indians from their ancestral homelands to the western, undeveloped part
of the continent." To survive, Native Americans would now have to as-
similate and to learn the ways of their American tutor.'6 This policy of
gradual assimilation into mainstream culture guided American policy
toward Native Americans throughout the nineteenth century.'7 The ex-
pectation was that the "Indians would become small republics protected
by the United States and at some distant future date might be represented
in the halls of Congress."'"
The United States intensified this policy until the late nineteenth
century, 9 when Congress enhanced its policy of assimilation.' In 1887,
9. See id. at 561. The Court indicated that the Cherokee Nation was:
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of [Clongress.
Id.
10. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
11. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
12. See Deloria, supra note 1, at 242-46. Deloria noted that Congress found itself in the posi-
tion of reconciling two contradictory interests: protecting the Indians and creating a bureaucracy
capable of regulating trade. See id. at 243. Because the Indians could not make correct "decisions"
for themselves, Congress designated itself as the decision maker for the Indians until they could or
decided to make "appropriate" decisions for themselves. See id. at 243-44.
13. Cf. id.
14. See id. at 242.
15. See HUGH BROGAN, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67-68
(1990).
16. See id. at 68.
17. See id.
18. Deloria, supra note 1, at 245.
19. See id. at 246.
20. Cf. id. at 246-47. Deloria notes that this policy is particularly reflected in the Allotment
Act, which shifted the American perspective from that of tutor to supervisor. See id.
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Congress enacted the Indian General Allotment Act, which created a
specific policy to force Native Americans to assimilate into white soci-
ety.' The statute was intended to turn the Indians into "true Americans"
by splitting native lands into individual plots for farming." The Supreme
Court affirmed this policy in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,' endorsing Con-
gress's right to unilaterally abrogate treaties with Native Americans. '
Through the Allotment Acts, Native Americans lost eighty-six million
acres of land between 1887 and 1934.' This devastating effect left the
Indians destitute and defeated.?
American policy toward Native Americans shifted again in the early
part of the twentieth century with the passage of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934.27 Indian identity and culture had almost disappeared
because the federal government had controlled all aspects of Native
American life for the previous fifty years.' This statute, an acknowledg-
ment by Congress that the policy focus of allotment had failed, allowed
for some degree of tribal autonomy. 9 The statute stopped the allotment of
tribal lands, allowed for Native American ceremonies, and attempted to
resuscitate Native American culture? This new congressional policy,
which emphasized decreasing Native American dependency on the fed-
eral government, escalated with the Termination Era of the 1950s.'
During this period, Congress enacted its legislation affecting Native
Americans with the sole intent of ending the dependency of Indians on
the federal government." As a reincarnation of the assimilation policies
of the nineteenth century, the Termination Era legislation attempted to
homogenize Indian culture with general American culture "by breaking
21. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996)).
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509 (2d ed. 1985).
23. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
24. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564-67.
25. See BROGAN, supra note 15, at 70.
26. See id.
27. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
28. See generally Tom Holm, Indian Concepts of Authority and the Crisis in Tribal Govern-
ment, Soc. Sa. J., July 1982, 59, 59-71, reprinted in Tom Holm, The Crisis in Tribal Government,
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 1, at 135, 135-54 (arguing that Indian culture faces obliv-
ion because internal political strife is largely caused by dissatisfaction with the operation of tribal
governments). Holm emphasizes that "Indian lands had been confiscated or dismembered; tribal
governments had been dissolved; American Indian arts had been all but lost; and tribal religious
ceremonies banned or destroyed." Id. at 140.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Sharon O'Brien, Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human
Rights, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 1, at 35, 44.
32. See id.
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down cultural and tribal bonds."'33 Ultimately, through this policy, Con-
gress terminated the relationship between itself and 109 Indian tribes.'
The 1970s and the Nixon Administration brought the current gov-
ernment policy of self-determination.' Despite the sweeping tone of this
policy, it applied only to federally recognized Indian tribes, excluding
almost one-third of the native peoples in the United States.' Unrecog-
nized tribes still must apply for and receive federal recognition to par-
ticipate in many federal programs designed for Native Americans.'7 The
relationship between the federal government and the Native American
tribes has come full circle and has evolved from one of a guardianship
back to a trust relationship, where American Indian tribes have some
degree of internal autonomy. 8
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT:
GUIDED SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Background
In the past decade federal courts have decided numerous cases in-
volving the rapid growth of the gaming industry, especially high-stakes
gambling, on Native American reservations. Before 1988, Native Ameri-
can tribes chose to develop gambling facilities on their respective reser-
vations as a lucrative, fast path toward economic growth and self-
sufficiency. 9 Federal statutes did not regulate reservation gambling, and
the states had no jurisdiction over the Indian casinos within their respec-
tive jurisdictions.' Gaming on reservations has tempered some of the
harsher effects of poverty some Native Americans have endured for gen-
erations and has enhanced the political power of a few tribes."
Controversy arose over tribal casinos in the 1970s and 1980s when
state governments began to dispute tribal authority to operate the casinos
without any state regulation.' Congress addressed state concerns with the
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Cf id. President Nixon noted that it was time for "a new era in which the Indian future is
determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions." Id. (citing MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at
1(1970)).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 45.
38. Cf id. at46.
39. Cf Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. A Forum for Conflict Among
the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REv.
127, 131 (1993).
40. See id. at 129.
41. See Sherry M. Thompson, Comment, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of
Reservation Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521, 521
(1994).
42. See id. at 528-29.
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enactment of the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).'
Intending to temper the escalating tension between states and Native
American reservations," the Congress enacted the IGRA to provide a
legal framework for Native Americans to use gaming "as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments."' Specifically, Congress attempted to create a bal-
ance between tribal and state interests with the creation and the
empowerment of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).' The
NIGC, a body composed of three members, two of whom must be Native
Americans,"7 oversees casino activities, supervises the parties, and evalu-
ates casino financial practices." The NIGC also has the authority to cre-
ate tribal gaming regulations, '9 to contract with tribal and state entities,"
and to conduct investigations of premises, records, and the bookkeeping
of tribal casinos."
The structure of the statute divided gaming into three categories:
Class 1,52 Class II," and Class HIL' The statute permits completely un-
regulated Class I gaming5 and limited regulation of Class II gaming.'
Class III gaming requires state assent." Receiving state assent requires
that tribes comply with certain specific procedures, including asking the
respective state to negotiate a Class III gaming compact." The state must
negotiate in good faith. 9 Should a state refuse to negotiate a gaming
compact with a tribe, the statute confers standing on the tribe to bring an
action against the state in federal court.' If the tribe can meet its burden
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. lI 1996).
44. Cf. Thompson supra note 41, at 522, 530. Congressional concern stemmed from the possi-
bility of the influence of organized crime and the lack of federal regulatory authority on reservations.
See id. at 530. Once again, with the construction of the statute, Congress assumed a guardian-type
role over Native Americans.
45. Id. at 530-31.
46. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (setting forth the composition of the National Indian Gaming Com-
mission and stating that at least two members of the Commission must be from an Indian tribe, and
no more than two members can be from the same political party).
47, See id. § 2704(b)(3).
48. See id. § 2706(b).
49. See id. § 2706(b)(10).
50. See id. § 2706(b)(7).
51. See id. § 2706(b)(2)-(4).
52. See id. § 2703(6). Class I gaming is for small prizes or gaming that includes traditional
Indian games used during traditional tribal ceremonies and festivals. Id. Neither the states nor the
federal government has the authority to regulate this type of gaming. Id. § 2710.
53. See id. § 2703(7). Class II gaming includes games such as lotto, bingo, and card games,
with the exclusion of banking card games such as blackjack and baccarat. Id. § 2703(7)(A)-(B).
54. See id. § 2703(8). Class II games include all games not listed under Class I or Class II,
such as banking card games, slots, keno, animal racing, and jai-alai.
55. See id. § 2703(6).
56. Seed. §2710(Ob).
57. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
58. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
59. See Ed.
60. See id § 2710(d)(7)(A) & (B).
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and prove that the state failed to negotiate in good faith, the district court
can order the state to conclude a compact with the tribe within a sixty-
day period. Should the state fail to negotiate a compact within this time
period, the tribe can resort to a federal mediator, who has the authority to
select one of the compacts proposed by either the state or the tribe.'
Should the state reject federal mediation, the Secretary of the Interior can
determine procedures to facilitate the conclusion of the compact.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida" significantly altered the operation of the IGRA.'
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe sued the state of Florida and
Governor Lawton Chiles for refusing to negotiate a Class In gaming
compact with the Tribe and for violating the "requirement of good faith
negotiation" mandated by section 2710(d)(3) of the IGRA.' Florida
moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint claiming that the suit violated
the state's sovereign immunity that protected it from suit in federal
court.' The district court denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, concluding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not give Con-
gress the power to abridge the Eleventh Amendment immunity granted to
the states." In addition, the Court also found that its precedent in Ex
parte Young did not allow a tribe to sue a state for good faith negotia-
tion and force a state's governor to negotiate with a tribe."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from enacting
legislation to allow Indian tribes to sue a state under the Indian Com-
merce Clause." The Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the
power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states and violate their
Eleventh Amendment rights under the Constitution. ' Thus, section
271 0(d)(7) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not confer federal
61. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) & (iii). A court must balance state interests against tribal inter-
ests. See id.
62. See id § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
63. See id § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
64. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
65. Cf Amy L. Cox, The New Buffalo: Tribal Gaming As a Means of a Subsistence Under
Attack, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 863, 871 (1998).
66. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44,51-52 (1996).
67. See id at 52.
68. See id. at 52-53.
69. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Ex parte Young, the Court decided an appeal based on a suit
brought by the stockholders of various railroad companies against, among others, members of sev-
eral regulatory bodies of the state of Minnesota and the Attorney General of Minnesota. Cf. id. at
127-30. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the promulgation and enforcement of price
controls fixing the tariff rates of railroads in Minnesota. See id. at 127-31. The Court decided that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit brought by citizens of a state or nation against another
state. See id. at 149.
70. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52.
71. See id. at 52-53.
72. See id. at 47.
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jurisdiction over a state that has not consented to be sued.' Finally, the
Court held that Ex parte Young could not be used to enforce the good
faith requirements of section 27 10(d)(3) against an official of the state. '
In analyzing the context of the statute, the Court determined that
Class III gaming was only legal if it was authorized by the Tribe's gov-
erning body, satisfied the requirements of the statute, was approved by
the NIGC, was located in a state permitting such gaming "for any pur-
pose by any person, organization, or entity,"' and conformed with the
tribal-state compact. 6 In its analysis of the statute and the constitutional
questions governing it, the Court addressed two issues: whether the
Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from authorizing suits by In-
dian tribes against the states as injunctive relief to enforce legislation
enacted by the Indian Commerce Clause, and whether the doctrine of Ex
parte Young permitted actions against a state's governor for injunctive
relief.' The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the
second in the negative.'
The Supreme Court addressed the Eleventh Amendment argument
and noted that the text indicated that the judicial power of the federal
government could not be extended to any action in "law or equity"
against a state by citizens of another state or a foreign nation.' The Court
held that the scope of the statute extended beyond Article III courts and
stood "not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... to
which it confirms."' This presupposition has two parts: each state is a
sovereign entity in the federal system, and a state cannot retain its sover-
eignty if it cannot consent to potential suits brought against it.8 Thus, the
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit against a state that does
not consent to be sued.' Here, Florida did not consent to be sued.83
The Tribe claimed that the IGRA abrogated state immunity and that
Congress explicitly expressed its intent to do so in the statute." Analyz-
ing this claim, the Court noted that Congress can only abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity "by making its intention unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute."' The Court examined the text of the statute, and
the language that specifically referred to the state as a defendant' and
73. See id.
74. See id.; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
75. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48.
76. See id. at 48-49.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 53.
79. Id. at 54 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. )a).
80. Id (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
81. See id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 55.
84. See id.
85. ld.,at 56 (quoting Delimuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
86. See id at 57.
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concluded that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. '
The Court then addressed whether, in abrogating the immunity, Congress
had overstepped its constitutional boundaries." The Court began by its
assessment by analyzing whether the Indian Commerce Clause conferred
on the federal government the authority to abrogate states' rights. ' Since
neither the language in article three, section two, clause one of the United
States Constitution, nor the absence of a prohibition in the text of the
Eleventh Amendment allowed a state to be sued without its consent,.' the
Seminole's claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."'
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether the Tribe might
exercise jurisdiction over its own suit to enforce the good faith require-
ments of section 2710(d)(3) against Governor Chiles, regardless of the
jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment.' The Court, however, did
not see the Seminole's situation as one similar to that in Ex parte
Young."3 In distinguishing the instant case from Ex parte Young, the
Court noted that the IGRA statute contained a provision for enforcement
in section 2710(d)(7). 4 The opinion emphasized that section 2710(d)(3)
provided a sixty-day requirement that the state and the tribe complete a
compact, should the state not negotiate in good faith.' In addition, if the
tribe and state did not satisfy the requirement within the sixty-day time
period, the statute required that both parties submit proposals to a federal
mediator, who then would select the best proposal." Finally, if the state
did choose not to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the me-
diator must notify the Secretary of the Interior, who then would prescribe
regulations for gaming on the reservation in question." Ultimately, the
87. See id.
88. See id. at 59.
89. See id. at 62. The Court referred to its decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989), where a plurality determined that the Interstate Commerce Clause allowed Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, noting that Congress had to have complete authority to regu-
late interstate commerce, including the authority to assess damages. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-
20 (1989). The Court recognized that the decision in Union Gas misled lower courts and granted
more power to Article Ill courts than the Constitution intended. Cf Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65.
The Court concluded that Union Gas departed from precedent and overruled the decision. See i. at
66.
90. See id. at 67.
91. Seeid.at73.
92. See id. The Seminoles argued that the court had, in the past, found federal jurisdiction
when a party sought only prospective injunctive relief. See id.; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985); cf 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
93. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73; cf Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
94. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-74. The Court noted that it would not allow a supple-
mental judicial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right if the statute had already
created a mechanism to enforce the right. See id. at 74; cf Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423
(1988).
95. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.
96. See id. The Court noted that the statute required that the federal mediator select the pro-
posal that best represented the intent of the statute. See id.
97. See id. at 74-75.
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Seminole Tribe could not use the Ex parte Young precedent because
Congress included a remedial provision in the statute that required the
submission of the state and tribal plans to a federal mediator, who se-
lected the plan that best comported with the statute and a provision that
allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to implement Class lII gaming
procedures should a state fail to accept the federal mediator's choice."
The Seminole Tribe decision undermined the IGRA." The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment recognizes a state's
right not to negotiate with Indian tribes over Class II gaming." Public
opinion, which historically has been opposed to Native American gam-
ing, no doubt, may encourage states not to negotiate with Native Ameri-
can tribes--especially now that the Supreme Court's decision in Semi-
nole Tribe has nullified the enforcement provision of the IGRA. ' ' The
Seminole Tribe decision has directly affected the outcome of the deci-
sions in the Tenth Circuit and other circuits that have addressed the issue
of Class III gaming on Native American reservations.
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly'"
a. Facts
In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
legality of Class III gaming on tribal casinos within New Mexico.'" The
Jicarilla Apaches negotiated a tribal-state, Class III gaming compact with
the governor of the state of New Mexico under the auspices of the
IGRA."'° On May 20, 1996, the Tribe opened a casino on its reserva-
tion.'" After the opening of the casino the United States Attorney for
New Mexico, John Kelly, warned the Tribe that the government would
take action against it for the illegal operation of a Class III gaming facil-
ity.' In response, the Tribe filed a lawsuit against John Kelly, United
States Attorney for the District of New Mexico; Janet Reno, Attorney
98. See id. at 76.
99. Cf Cox, supra note 65, at 871-72.
100. See id. at 872. Because states now have immunity from litigation via the Eleventh
Amendment, the statutory safeguard that the states negotiate in good faith not longer exists, giving
the states "veto" power over Class III gambling. Id.
101. See id. at 874.
102. 129 F.3d 535 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 536.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Cf Brief for Appellant at 3, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Kelly, 129 F.3d 535 (10th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-2192).
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General of the United States; and Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior,
alleging four claims."
First, in seeking declaratory relief, the Tribe argued that the com-
pact allowed it the right to continue its Class InI gaming activities." Sec-
ond, the Tribe claimed that its casino was legal and that its threatened
closure by the federal government violated the Tribe's Fifth Amendment
rights."° Third, the Tribe claimed that Class III gaming was legal and
authorized by federal law and the compact.'' Fourth, the Jicarilla
Apaches claimed that the defendants had a fiduciary duty to protect the
Tribe's gaming activities from interference by others "purporting to act
under color of state or federal law.""' The defendants counterclaimed and
sought an order declaring the Class III gambling activities by the Tribe to
be illegal, violating both New Mexico and federal law."' The district
court issued an order invalidating the compact and dismissing the Tribe's
claim for declaratory relief."'
b. Decision
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Tenth Circuit
based its decision on Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly,"" where it held that a
compact nearly identical to the one in this case was invalid because it
violated the IGRA and New Mexico state law."' In Pueblo, the Tenth
Circuit made several central determinations regarding the IGRA statute.
First, the court decided that the parties to a compact, the state and the
tribe, must have agreed to form a gaming compact and that the compact
must govern both of the parties before the Secretary of the Interior can
approve Class III gaming on the reservation in question."6 Second, the
court held that state law dictated the process by which a state legally can




111. Id. The Jicarilla Apaches also argued that New Mexico waived its Eleventh Amendment
Immunity by filing a pleading in reply to the Tribe's claims. See id. a 537. Additionally, the Tribe
challenged the district court's dismissal of its case, which prevented it from filing a cross claim
against New Mexico for failure to negotiate in good faith. See id. a 537-38.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 536-37.
114. 104 F.3d 1546 (l0th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997).
115. See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1559. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court
decision upon which the district court relied in dismissing the action of the Jicarilla Apaches. See id.
The court found that the Governor of New Mexico did not have the authority to negotiate a compact
with the Tribe under New Mexico law. See id. The court also rejected the Jicarilla Apache's attempt
to distinguish its claim from the facts in Pueblo of Santa Ana by recognizing that New Mexico law
estopped the state from arguing the illegality of the agreement and also that New Mexico did not
negotiate in good faith. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537.
116. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537 (quoting Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at
1553).
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enter into a compact with a tribe."7 Third, the Tenth Circuit agreed with
the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson on the
issue of whether New Mexico and a Native American tribe had estab-
lished a legal compact under New Mexico law."' It held that the New
Mexico Supreme Court was correct in its conclusion that the governor's
lack of authority undermined the legality of any compact negotiated un-
der the IGRA."9 Based on Pueblo of Santa Ana and the decision of the
New Mexico Supreme Court, the court concluded that that the compact
in the instant case between the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and governor failed
under both state law and the IGRA.
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Tribe's request to remand the
case to the district court so that it could file its cross-claim against New
Mexico for failure to negotiate in good faith.' The court concluded that
the lower court's dismissal of the claim was neither premature nor incor-
rect."' It supported its decision by referring to Seminole Tribe,' which
held that the Eleventh Amendment shields states from litigation. '" De-
spite the limitations created by the Eleventh Amendment, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that immunity can be waived.2" In applying this standard, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the Jicarilla Apache's claim that the state of New
Mexico waived its sovereign immunity, noting that New Mexico never
filed a motion to dismiss; it merely entered an appearance."z The court
emphasized that an appearance in court is not, in itself, a definitive
waiver of sovereign immunity.
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico'27
a. Facts
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Apache Tribe
of the Mescalero Reservation could sue the state of New Mexico to com-
pel the state to negotiate a Class III gaming compact."8 The Mescalero
Apache Tribe began negotiating with the state to conclude a tribal Class
117. Id. In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995), the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered both the state constitution and state law in holding that neither authorized the
governor of New Mexico to negotiate and sign a gaming compact. See Johnson, 904 P.2d at 22-26.
118. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 537.
119. See id. The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in
Pueblo of Santa Ana and that the decision by the Tenth Circuit is the law of the circuit. See id.
120. See id.
121. Seeid. at538.
122. For a discussion of Seminole Tribe, see supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
123. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 129 F.3d at 538.
124. See id. The court noted, however, that waiver is difficult to prove and must be "unequivo-
cal ... [since clonstructive consent is insufficient." Id. (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544,
1553 (10th Cir. 1995)).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 131 F.3d 1379 (10th Cir. 1997).
128. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1380.
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III gaming compact in the late 1980s.'" In the early 1990s, a task force
established by then Governor Bruce King and the Tribe arrived at a ten-
tative agreement to allow limited gaming on the reservation." Later,
however, the governor refused to sign the agreement.'3 ' In 1992, the Tribe
filed an action to compel New Mexico to negotiate a Class II gaming
compact,'32 alleging bad faith negotiation by the governor and the state of
New Mexico under section 2710(d)(7).'33
New Mexico filed a motion to dismiss the Tribe's case, arguing that
its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the Tribe's claim." The dis-
trict court agreed with New Mexico and dismissed the case.' In Ponca
Tribe v. Oklahoma,"' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that states cannot assert either the Tenth or the Eleventh Amend-
ments as defenses to an IGRA action to compel good faith negotiation.'37
On remand, New Mexico filed an answer and a counterclaim requesting
an order that the compact was invalid, again arguing that a state cannot
be sued by a tribe because of the immunity protections of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments' 38
In turn, the Mescalero Apaches filed a motion to strike the state's
constitutional defenses and counterclaim for constitutional immunity. "9
New Mexico moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim that the
tribal compact was invalid."' While on remand, the United States Su-
preme Court decided Seminole Tribe,"' invalidating the IGRA provision
abridging Eleventh Amendment immunity protection for the states." In
light of its decision in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court vacated the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma and remanded the
case to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration."3
129. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379
(10th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2156) (hereinafter Mascalero Appellant's Brief].
130. Id. at 5-6.
131. Id. at 6. The governor also refused to sign a negotiated compact with the Sandia Tribe, in
spite of the recommendations to sign by all of the tribes and the New Mexico Attorney General. id.
132. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
133. See Mascalero Appellant's Brief, supra note 129, at 6.
134. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381; cf. Mascalero Appellant's Brief, supra
note 129, at 7 (detailing the procedural history).
135. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
136. See 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated by 517 U.S. 1129 (1996). The Tenth Circuit
chose to consider four separate Indian gaming appeals, including that of the Mescalero Apaches,
because the dispositive issues were identical. See id at 1425 n.1.
137. See Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1437.
138. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).




After the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe and its subse-
quent decision to vacate the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ponca Tribe, the
district court held a hearing on the outstanding motions of both parties.'"
The district court denied the Mescalero Apache's motion to strike New
Mexico's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. 5 It granted the
Tribe's motion to strike New Mexico's Tenth Amendment immunity
defenses and denied the Tribe's motion to dismiss New Mexico's coun-
terclaim.' 6 It granted the State's motion for 'summary judgment on the
compact's legality, finding that the compact was invalid, and the Tribe
appealed.'47
During the pendency of Tribe's appeal, the Tenth Circuit decided
the case of Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly'" and found that the compacts
entered into by the tribes, which were very similar to the Mescalero
Apache compact, were invalid and not "in effect" under the IGRA." The
court held that New Mexico law did not grant the governor the authority
to negotiate a compact with the tribe."
The Tenth Circuit sought to clarify the issues on appeal by ordering
the parties to brief the following issues: the effect of the decision in Pueblo
of Santa Ana on this appeal,"' and the effect that recent changes in New
Mexico state law might have on any of the issues raised by the appeal.' 2
The Mescalero Apaches argued that Pueblo of Santa Ana was not
controlling because the issues presented in this appeal were not raised in
that case. ' First, the Tribe sought to distinguish its appeal from Pueblo
of Santa Ana because the United States was not a party to the suit, as it
had been in Pueblo of Santa Ana, and the court did not have to consider
whether the federal government was an indispensable party.'" The court
decided that the state's counterclaim would stand even if the United
States were a necessary party because the federal government cannot be
sued without its consent. The court concluded that it could only grant





148. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997).
149. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1559.
150. See id.
151. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1381.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1381-82.
154. See id. at 1382. The Tenth Circuit noted that deciding whether or not a party is indispensa-
ble includes a determination under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) that the party is necessary and can be joined
if possible. See id. at 1383. The elements that determine whether a party is necessary include
whether complete relief is available to the individuals and entities already party to the suit, whether
the unnamed party has an interest in the claims and would be hampered by its absence, and whether
a party in the suit would be at a substantial risk of "multiple or inconsistent obligations." Id.
155. See id.
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that the federal government was also an indispensable party.'" Second,
the Tribe argued that the absence of the federal government in this dis-
pute compelled the court to decide whether Congress abrogated the
Tribe's sovereign immunity."5 Third, the Tribe claimed that the court did
not address the political question doctrine in Pueblo of Santa Ana, an
issue for consideration in the instant case, because the court did not have
the jurisdiction to entertain the claim under the doctrine. 8 Fourth, the
Tribe argued that New Mexico's form of sovereign immunity differed
from that of Florida in the application of Seminole Tribe. 9 Last, the
Tribe argued that New Mexico had substantially changed its law as re-
lated to this decision, requiring the court to revisit its decision in Pueblo
of Santa Ana.'
6
New Mexico countered the Tribe's arguments by contending that
the holding in Pueblo of Santa Ana was binding in this appeal because
the Tenth Circuit found that the compacts in Pueblo of Santa Ana, which
were identical to the compacts in this case, were invalid.' The state also
argued that recent changes in New Mexico law now allowed the gover-
nor to enter into gaming negotiations with tribes.'6" New Mexico reported
that the state and the Apaches had entered into a new Class III gaming
compact,'" and that the recent state law changes and the new compact
between New Mexico required the Tenth Circuit to certify three state law
questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court before deciding the merits
of the appeal."'
156. See id. The court sets out the rules of an indispensable party as enumerated in FED. R. CIv.
P. 19(b), which include the degree that a judgment made in the individual's absence would be preju-
dicial to the individual or already named parties, the degree by which the prejudice can be lessened
by the judgment through relief and other considerations, if the judgment will be "adequate" despite
the absence of the individual, and if the plaintiff will retain a sufficient remedy even if the case is
dismissed for nonjoinder. See id. The court also noted that the Supreme Court of the United States
has required that any court reviewing an appeal from an appellate perspective for the first time
analyze the successful plaintiff's interest in maintaining the judgment, the defendant's unsuccessful
attempts to litigate his claim, the interest of the individual not named in the suit, and the interests of
judicial time and efficiency. See id (citing Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United
States, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1969))).





162. See id. The state claimed that New Mexico had recently enacted legislation giving the
governor the authority to make compacts with tribes. See id
163. See id.
164. See id. New Mexico, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, requested that
the court certify the following questions: (1) Whether the New Mexico legislature acted within its
constitutional authority when enacting the state statute, (2) Whether the tribal resolution authorized
the governor to negotiate and to enter into a treaty with the tribe, and (3) If the statute was unconsti-
tutional, whether the defective portions of the statute could be excised from the valid sections of the
statute. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issues raised, including whether the
United States was an indispensable party, the applicability of the prece-
dent in Seminole, tribal sovereign immunity, the political question doc-
trine, the court's jurisdiction over the counterclaim, and the changes in
New Mexico law.'" The court concluded that the Tribe was correct in
asserting that the issues of indispensability could be raised at any time,
despite the fact that the Tribe only raised the issue after an initial unfa-
vorable ruling." The court concluded that the United States was not an
indispensable party to the action.67 Citing its precedent in Pueblo of
Santa Ana, it found that the approval of the Secretary of the Interior
could not and did not predicate the intrinsic legality of the compact. '"
The court also concluded that the absence of the government did not
prejudice any party to the action and that the United States could not
challenge the ruling in a later claim.'" Finally, the court determined that
judicial efficiency weighed against the inclusion of the federal govern-
ment as an indispensable party.7 The court held the state's counterclaim
valid, despite the absence of the federal government.'
Next, the Tenth Circuit considered the applicability of Seminole
Tribe to the Tribe's claims." The court rejected the Tribe's argument
drawing distinctions between their situation and Seminole Tribe, and held
that the Tribe's argument confused general state sovereignty and Elev-
enth Amendment immunity." Citing Seminole Tribe, the court explained
that a state could waive its general sovereign immunity in state court and
subject itself to a civil action.'7' A waiver, however, is not enough to ab-
rogate its Eleventh Amendment immunity.'" The court emphasized that
immunity encompassed not only whether the state could be sued but also
165. The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the district court's holdings. See id. at
1383. The district court concluded that the Ponca Tribe decision, which held that the IGRA did not
violate the Tenth Amendment, was binding in the instant case. See id. The court also found that New
Mexico had Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for failure to negotiate in good faith. See id.
In addition, the district court held that New Mexico did not waive this claim by filing a counter-
claim. See id. The court also held that it had the jurisdiction to determine the state's counterclaim
and that the Tribe's sovereign immunity action did not bar it from hearing this claim. Id. at 1382-83.
It also concluded that the state's counterclaim was not barred by the political question doctrine. See
id. at 1383. Finally, the court ruled that the compact negotiated by the New Mexico governor and the
Tribe was invalid because the governor lacked the requisite constitutional authority to negotiate with
the Tribe on New Mexico's behalf. See id.
166. See id. at 1383.
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when it could be sued.'76 Therefore, the court concluded that New Mexico
must explicitly specify its intention to waive its immunity in federal
court and emphasized that New Mexico's actions did not alter its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity from actions in federal court.'" Thus, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to
strike New Mexico's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.'
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the tribal sovereign immunity
issue and whether Congress abrogated this protection.'7 Citing Santa
Clara Pueblo,"w the court reasoned that common law immunity protects
Native American tribes from litigation.'8 ' The court did not consider this
immunity to be absolute and noted that it could be waived in an affirma-
tive act.'" However, it noted that the exception to the rule is narrow and
any act must be express and unmistakable. 3 The court also noted that the
IGRA gave the district court authority over any claim to prevent Class III
gaming activity on Indian reservations.'" The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the IGRA waived tribal sovereign immunity not only in instances
involving compliance with IGRA provisions, but also in situations where
one party requested injunctive relief in its initial claims."
The court summarily addressed the fourth, fifth, and sixth issues.
The court, relying on its opinion in Pueblo of Santa Ana, determined that
the claim was justiciable.'" In assessing whether or not it has jurisdiction
176. See id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,241 (1985)).
177. Seeki.
178. See id. at 1385. The court of appeals also addressed whether New Mexico waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing a counterclaim against the Tribe. See id at n.4. Agreeing
with the district court's sua sponte resolution of this matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even
though a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consent to be sued, a "stringent
test" must be used to determine the validity of such waiver. See id. (citing Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d
1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995)). This test is satisfied only upon a showing that the language is so ex-
press in its intent or in its statutory or constitutional mandate "as [will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction." Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40
(1985)) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). The Tenth Circuit concluded that
New Mexico had not waived its sovereign immunity by filing a counterclaim or responding to a
claim against it. See id. (citing Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427 (8th Cir.
1997); American Fed'n. of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Corrections Dep't., 783 F. Supp.
1320, 1327 (D.N.M. 1992); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Roundtree Transp. & Rigging, Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 1204, 1206-07 (M.D. Fla. 1995)).
179. See id at 1385.
180. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
181. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1385.
182. See id.
183. See id. (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1386. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the state's counterclaim was not a non-
justiciable political question and that the claim was not made in Pueblo of Santa Ana, which showed
why the argument did not succeed. See id The court explained that a political question involves a
"'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political develop-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."' See id. (quot-
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over the claim, the court concluded that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction,
again referring to its decision in Pueblo of Santa Ana.'" Finally, the court
refused to decide whether the recent legislation passed by the New
Mexico had any bearing on the outcome of the instant case, noting that
the new statute was not at issue."
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits also wrestled with gaming issues during the survey
period. The Sixth Circuit, in reversing a district court decision, con-
cluded that the IGRA applied to gaming in Keweenaw Bay Indian Com-
munity v. United States.'" In this case, the Tribe acquired a plot of land
that was later taken into trust by the federal government for the benefit of
the Keweenaw Tribe.'" The Tribe and the state of Michigan agreed to
negotiate a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming on tribal lands if the
Tribe met four conditions.'9' The Tribe met each of the stated conditions
and applied for approval from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).'92 The
BIA indicated that the Tribe must conform to the requirements enumer-
ated in section 2719 of IGRA.93 The Tribe refused and sued the state in
federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief.'" The Sixth
Circuit rejected the Tribe's argument that the existence of the compact
removed gaming from the jurisdiction of IGRA'9" and found that the va-
lidity of its compact did not exclude it from conforming with section
2719 of the IGRA.
The Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of Class III gaming in
United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska."" When negotiations
between the state of Nebraska and the Sioux Tribe to open a Class III
ing Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1647 n.34 (1997) (quoting Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962))). The court emphasized that it resolved the issue of the legality of the gaming compact,
which the Tribe claimed was non-justiciable, in Pueblo of Santa Ana. See id.
187. See id. The court of appeals noted that in Pueblo of Santa Ana, the Tribe agreed that the
Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction over the gaming compact but that the Tribe would not agree that the
court had jurisdiction over New Mexico's counterclaim. See id It did not put any credence in the
Tribes "concession," noting that it had an independent duty to determine whether, in fact, it did have
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction in Pueblo
of Santa Ana and that it also had jurisdiction in the instant case. See id.
188. See id. at 1386-87. The court explained that the new legislation was not part of the case or
controversy of the case and that events since Pueblo of Santa Ana did not require it to reconsider that
decision. See id.
189. 136 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1998).
190. See Keweenaw Bay, 136 F.3d at 471.
191. See id. The four conditions included: (1) endorsement by the tribal council and approval of
the tribal chairperson. (2) approval by the governor and state legislature by resolution. (3) endorse-
ment by the Secretary of the Interior. (4) publication in the Federal Register. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 471-72.
195. See id. at 475-76.
196. See id. at 475.
197. 135 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1998).
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gaming facility failed in the early 1990s, the Tribe opened the facility
anyway. ' Concurrently, the Tribe sued Nebraska for failure to negotiate
in good faith.'" After a NIGC decision, the Tribe was forced to close its
facility.' The district court did not enjoin the Tribe from its gaming ac-
tivity."' In reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, the Sixth
Circuit determined that the Attorney General had the authority to enforce
the closure order, 2 that the Tribe's operation of the video poker, black-
jack, and slot machines was illegal,' that Nebraska law provided for
injunctive relief,' and that the Tribe's operation of the casino was a
violation of IGRA.'
The Ninth Circuit decided two cases regarding the IGRA during the
same time period. In United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians,' the
court addressed whether the portions of the IGRA not struck down by
Seminole Tribe remained valid.' The dispute revolved around compact
negotiations that went sour between the state of Washington and the
Spokane Tribe.' The district court dismissed the Tribe's claim against
Washington based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. ' During the pen-
dency of its initial claim, the Tribe increased its gaming activity, despite
the lack of a valid compact."' The district court issued an order enjoining
the Tribe from most of its gaming activities. "' The Ninth Circuit found
that those portions of the IGRA that had not been overruled by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe remained valid but could not
serve as the foundation for an injunction invalidating tribal gaming.
212
Thus, the court vacated~the injunction and remanded the case back to the
district court, noting that other agencies within the executive branch, such
as the Department of the Interior, might also serve as appropriate forums
for the resolution of the differences between the Tribe and the state.213
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the IGRA in Confederated
Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. State of Oregon,2"4 which arose out
of compact negotiations between the Tribe and the state of Oregon for a
198. See Santee Sioux, 135 F.3d at 560.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 561.
201. See id
202. See id at 562.
203. See id at 564.
204. See id. at 564-65.
205. See id. at 563-65.
206. 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).





212. See id. at 1298.
213. See id. at 1302.
214. 143 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 76:3
FEDERAL INDIAN LA W
casino on their reservation.! The parties agreed that the state could
monitor gaming activity in the casino." ' After the routine inspection of
the casino, the state announced to the Tribe that it intended to release its
report as required by the Oregon Public Records statute."' The Tribe sued
to prevent the release of this report.2"8 The district court granted the
Tribe's motion for summary judgment, and the state of Oregon ap-
pealed.2' The Ninth Circuit held that the compact did not prevent the
state of Oregon from releasing its report under the public records stat-
ute.' The court also found that the IGRA did not prevent the application
of Oregon's public records laws.'
D. Analysis
The recent decisions in the circuit courts reflect the tension and the
inconsistencies of the Supreme Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe. Semi-
nole Tribe has gutted the effective functioning of the IGRA and the abil-
ity of Native American tribes to establish and to implement a reliable
form of income.2 The decision in Seminole Tribe has removed the parity
between the states and Native American tribes. States now have the power
to squelch Class Ell gaming without any serious discussion or negotiation
with the tribe.' 3 The Court effectively has placed Class I1 gaming under
the jurisdiction of the states, weakening the ability of Native Americans to
implement Class III gaming activities on their reservations.
Consequently, the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have broken
with recent precedent in fostering and maintaining Native American tribal
sovereignty. The Tenth Circuit and other federal courts now no longer
have the power to mediate disputes between Native American tribes and
the states. The Supreme Court has limited the power of federal courts to
215. See Siletz Indians, 143 F.3d at 483.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 484 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-192.505 (1996)).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 484-85.
221. See id.
222. See Joanne C. Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees: Reflections on a New
Relationship, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 175, 180 (1998); Cox, supra note 65, at
863; Heidi L. McNeil, Indian Gaming in Arizona the Great Casino Controversy Continues, ARiz.
A'rr'Y. 13, 13 (1998); cf William Bennet Cooper, 11, Comment, What's in the Cards for the Future
of Indian Gaming Law? 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 129 (1998). But see Sharon Wheeler, Comment,
Is the Die Cast? Indian Casino Gaming in Maine, 50 ME. L. REv. 143, 144 (1998).
223. State concerns over tribal gaming include, among other things, license fees, the impair-
ment of state sovereignty, loss of revenue, and state concerns over the extent of tribal sovereignty.
Cf. Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Com-
pacts Under the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act, 29 ARIz. ST. LJ. 25, 26-28 (1998); Cooper,
supra note 222, at 129; Brian Casey Fitzpatrick, Case Note, Finding a Fair Forum: Federal Juris-
diction for IGRA Compact Actions in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 35 IDAHO L.
REv. 159, 161 (1998); Brad Jolly, Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering
Policy of Termination Continues, 29 ARmz. ST. LJ. 273, 274 (1997).
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assert jurisdiction over such disputes, and as a result, has departed from
decades of judicial deference not only to the tribes but also to congres-
sional leadership. The result has limited the statute's intent to retain parity
between the parties. Without recourse in the federal courts, Native Ameri-
can tribes no longer have an effective remedy to compel a recalcitrant
state to negotiate in good faith. Although the remaining sections of the
IGRA remain in effect in some circuits, these sections are unenforceable
without the judicial remedies designed to enforce them. While the Court's
Eleventh Amendment analysis presents compelling arguments, interest-
ingly, the Court does not address the other side of the issue: Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause and its power to regulate interstate
commerce under its express power conferred by Article I of the Constitu-
tion. Clearly, both Congress and tribal sovereignty must subjugate them-




The federal government classifies Native Americans as members of
political organizations, or tribes, not as members of a particular ethnic
group-a' Congress often relies on tribal membership in identifying
whether a person can be treated as a Native American for federal legisla-
tion and government programs.2' Because the government has negotiated
treaties with separate Indian tribes and not with the Native Americans
themselves, its primary responsibility lies in its obligations to the tribe,
not to the individuals.26 The judiciary consistently has upheld a tribe's
right to determine its own basis for membership.'m A tribe can create
membership "by usage, by written law, by treaty with the United States,
or even by intertribal agreement."'
Native American tribes register their members on tribal rolls, but
requirements for such registration vary.' The criteria can range from
one-quarter to as much as one-half Indian ancestry; other tribes do not
have such stringent, or any, requirements.w Some tribes even allow for
224. Cf Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-based and Membership-based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PIT. L. REv. 1, 79-81 (1993).
225. See id. at 84.
226. See id. (noting that "in a number of statutory provisions, and regulations promulgated
under such provisions, being an Indian and being a tribal member are synonymous, or tribal mem-
bership alone is one possible ground for an individual being considered an 'Indian"').
227. Cf COHEN, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that the tribe has the power "to grant, deny, revoke,
and qualify membership").
228. Id.
229. See id. at 22-23.
230. See id. at 23.
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the enrollment of all tribal relatives, regardless of blood content."' Con-
gress has the authority to determine tribal membership in a different
fashion if it chooses to facilitate the administration of Native American
affairs. 2
B. Tenth Circuit Case-United States v. Von Murdock "3
1. Facts
United States v. Von Murdock must be viewed within the context of
the Ute Termination Act (UTA).' Congress intended the UTA to divide
and distribute the assets of the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation between full-blooded and mixed-blooded members of the Tribe.2
5
The goals of the statute include "the termination of Federal supervision
over the trust, and restricted property, of the mixed-blood members ... ;
and for a development program for the full-blood members .... to assist
them in preparing for termination of Federal supervision over their prop-
erty." ' The statute defines "full-blooded" Utes as individuals with one-
half Ute ancestry and "mixed-blooded" as individuals with less than one-
half Ute ancestry."" The Utes created rolls consisting of mixed-blood and
full-blood Utes, which were published in the Federal Register and be-
came final after a review and protest period.' The statute stipulates that
the Tribe can only determine new membership according to the laws and
regulations promulgated by the Tribe.239 It also divides tribal assets of the
mixed-ancestry Utes evenly.2' Finally, it calls for the establishment of a
tribal committee to manage assets that cannot be equitably divided."
The defendant's parents were listed on the final rolls as mixed-
blood Utes according to the terms of the statute and thus received their
share of the Tribe's property. ' 2 According to the property distribution of
the UTA, the defendant's parents lost their respective memberships and
all rights in tribal property after the final asset distribution. 3 The defen-
231. See id.
232. See id Congress can create different distinctions for Native Americans for the purpose of
determining "eligibility for social programs, jurisdiction in criminal matters, preference in govern-
mental hiring, and administration of tribal property." Id
233. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 41 (1998).
234. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1994); cf Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 535.
235. See 25 U.S.C. § 677.
236. Id.
237. Id. § 677a(b)-(c).
238. See id. § 677g. The statute indicates that that the Tribe will only be made up of full-
blooded members and that mixed-blooded Utes cannot have an interest in the Tribe unless the statute
indicates otherwise. See id. § 677d.
239. See id. § 677d.
240. See id. § 677i.
241. See id.
242. See United States v. Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 41 (1998).
243. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 536.
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dant, Von Murdock, applied with the Ute Tribe for permission to hunt on
tribal lands.2" The Tribe denied the application, noting that he was not a
member of the Tribe and had no ancestral rights to the land. Von Mur-
dock hunted on the Ute lands anyway.' The authorities arrested him and
charged him with hunting on Indian tribal land in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1165.2
The defendant claimed that since he was a member of the Tribe, he
had a right to the use of the tribal land, and that the UTA was unconsti-
tutional. 7 The district court rejected defendant's argument, and defen-
dant entered a plea of nolo contendere.' The defendant appealed his
conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.4 9
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district courtl ° In
addition, the court denied defendant's rehearing petition and revised its
published opinion of October 20, 1997.f' Citing both the tribal constitu-
tion and the UTA, the court determined that because defendant's parents
had already received their share of the tribal property, they were no
longer members of the Tribe. 2 Therefore, Von Murdock was not a
member of the Tribe and not eligible for tribal membership. 3 The court
noted that defendant based his argument on the Kalamath Termination
Act (KTA) discussion in the Kimball cases.' Using both Kimball cases,
the defendant reasoned that because the KTA did not terminate the user
rights of terminated descendants, the UTA could not terminate his user
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 535.
247. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 537.
248. See id. at 535.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. The court opted to "issue... a revised opinion nunc pro tunc to October 20, 1997,"
and withdraw the opinion of October 20, 1997. Id.
252. See id at 536.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 536-37. In Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), decided in 1974,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, five Kalamath Indians who withdrew from the Tribe, re-
tained their treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish without state interference, even though they had been
compensated for their portions of tribal property. Kimball, 493 F.3d at 567. The Ninth Circuit based
its opinion on the United States Supreme Court decision regarding the Menominee Termination Act
in Menominee Tribe v. United States, where the Court found that because the statute did not specifi-
cally mention the hunting and fishing rights of the Tribe, it could not be used in a manner that abro-
gated such rights without explicit congressional intent. Id. (citing Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U.S. 404,412 (1968)). In the second Kimball case, Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.
1979), the Ninth Circuit affirmed its decision in the first Kimball case and explained that it had based
its decision and analysis on the explicit language in the Ute Termination Act that indicated that
withdrawal from the Tribe did not extinguish the right to hunt or fish on tribal lands.
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rights.'2 In addition, the defendant argued that the tribal rights at issue in
this case were only those of the Uintah Tribe and not the Ute Tribe.
Therefore, the defendant claimed that he had rights to use the land as a
member of the Uintah band.'
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the decision by the district court by fo-
cusing a significant amount of attention on the Felter cases.5 7 In Felter,
the state prosecuted the defendant, a mixed-blood Ute terminated from
the Tribe after the passage of the statute, for fishing on the tribal lands
without a permit." The district court found that the UTA did not explic-
itly deny mixed-blooded Utes the right to hunt and fish on tribal land,
and conversely, that UTA did not have any statutory language preserving
the rights of mixed-bloods to indivisible tribal assets. 9 Using the deci-
sion in Menominee Tribe, the district court held that because the UTA
did not specifically extinguish hunting and fishing rights or individual
interests in these rights and that these rights were specifically preserved
by the statute, withdrawal from the Tribe did not eliminate the right to
hunt and to fish on tribal lands if not specifically stated in the statute.m
In considering the hunting and fishing rights held by the Tribe and
mixed-blooded Utes, the district court held that such rights and powers
belong to the Tribe and that these rights are to be determined in relation
to the Tribe's right, noting that the rights of a tribe are "owned by the
tribal entity, and not as a tenancy in common of the individual members,
including hunting and fishing rights." ' Therefore, while leaving the
Tribe would eliminate all of the individual rights of the withdrawing
member in the Tribe's property, section 677(i) of the UTA preserved the
rights of a mixed-blood Ute to use tribal property.' Based on this analy-
sis, the district court decided that Utes of mixed-blood listed on the final
roll could hunt and fish on tribal lands while living, the right terminating
at an individual's death.263
In Felter, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court,
holding that the language in Menominee Tribe dictated that UTA could
not be interpreted as abridging the right to hunt and fish on tribal lands
255. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 539.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 538-39.
258. See id. at 538.
259. See id. (citing United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp 1002, 1017 (D. Utah 1982)).
260. See idt (citing Kimball 1I,.590 F.2d at 773).
261. Id. (citing Kimball l1, 590 F.2d at 1021).
262. See id. (citing Kimball 11, 590 F.2d at 1023). The district court decided that this right is a
personal right that was not "alienable, assignable, transferable nor descendable." Id. The court based
its decision on Grits v. Fisher, which held that tribal lands and funds belonged to the community
"and not to the members severally or as tenants in common." Id (citing Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S.
640, 642 (1912)). Individual rights to use of tribal property are predicated by tribal membership, a
right that ends at death or termination. See id. (citing Gritts, 224 U.S. at 642).
263. See id. at 538-39 (citing Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1025).
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because of the absence of any express language in the statute.' The court
agreed that hunting and fishing rights on reservation lands are tribal
rights and that tribal members hold user rights to reservation lands.f' The
court declined to impute a desire by Congress to eliminate hunting and
fishing rights of mixed-blood Utes to the statute.26 In Von Murdock, the
court emphasized that the defendant used the Felter cases as a basis for
his claim that he had a right to hunt and fish on tribal lands. 7 The court
concluded that the Felter cases could not be interpreted in a manner that
would support the defendant's claims.'
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments.' Citing the
statute, the court decided that the UTA specifically ended the tribal
membership of Native Americans of mixed-ancestry. 7 The court rein-
forced its decision by explaining that a tribe, had the right to determine its
own membership.'" In addition, the court also decided that the Ute Con-
stitution specifically abolished the Uintah Band of the Ute Tribe.Y It also
rejected the defendant's arguments claiming that the UTA was uncon-
stitutional and violated his right to equal protection.*' The court upheld
the UTA against claims that it arbitrarily and capriciously discriminated
against Utes of mixed ancestry.' The court underpinned this conclusion
by noting that the racial classifications used by the Utes were permissible
considering the relationship between the federal government and Native
American tribes." The court also found no equal protection violation, 6
264. See id. at 539 (citing United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1506 (10th Cir. 1985)).
265. See id. (citing Felter, 752 F.2d at 1510).
266. See id. The court concluded that the right to hunt and to fish cannot be equitably and
practically distributed. See id
267. See id.
268. See id. The court noted that despite the fact that the district court and the Tenth Circuit
cited to the Kimball cases in the Felter case, they only concurred with the decision of the Ninth
Circuit that under Menominee Tribe, congressional intent to abolish tribal rights will not be found
unless there is explicit language in the statute. See id. (citing Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509-10 & n.8;
Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1011, 1018).
269. See id at 541. The court argued that defendant's claim was precluded by the precedent in
Felter, noting that user rights were predicated by the holder's status as a tribal member, and were,
therefore, personal rights that could not be conveyed to another. See id. at 539-40; cf Felter, 752
F.2d at 1509.
270. See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 540.
271. See id
272. See id. at 541. The court noted that "jurisdiction over what was formerly the territory of
the Uintah Band was to be exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the rights formerly vested in the
Uintah Band were to be defined by the Ute Constitution." Id.
273. See id. The court decided that the defendant did not have the standing to raise any of the
constitutional issues in his claims. See id at 542. Nonetheless, the court proceeds to address the
defendant's equal protection and due process arguments anyway. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. The court noted that "'[flederal regulation of Indian tribes ... is governance of
once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a racial group consist-




nor any violation of the defendant's procedural due process claim, ex-
plaining that the notice of termination of mixed-ancestry Native Ameri-
cans received adequate notice in the Federal Register.' Finally, the court
rejected the defendant's claim that the statute violated the Tribe's First
Amendment rights, noting that the defendant had no standing to assert
his claim. 78 The opinion noted that since Von Murdock was not a mem-
ber of the Tribe, he had no standing to assert an infringement of the con-
stitutional rights guaranteed to the Tribe.279
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit remained consistent with legislative and judicial
policies granting deference to Native Americans in regulating their inter-
nal affairs and membership.' The court's opinion followed the express
language of the statute and allowed the Tribe to determine its member-
ship and whether an individual of Native American ancestry falls within
the prescribed criteria established for tribal membership.l' Native
Americans have complete authority to govern themselves within the con-
fines of the reservation. In this instance, the only decision by the Tenth
Circuit in the survey period addressing this issue remained consistent
with congressional intent and recent public policy regarding tribal sover-
eignty and self-government. Only the respective tribe can assess who can
remain as a member of a tribe and establish the criteria in determining
the ancestry (i.e., ethnic composition) necessary to remain as a member
of the tribe. Because such determinations belong solely to a tribe, federal
courts will not to involve themselves in issues involving who can claim
himself or herself of tribal membership.
III. INDIAN TRUST LANDS
A. Background
During the nineteenth century, the federal policy of removing Na-
tive Americans from their ancestral homelands slowly gave way to the
policies of the reservation and allotment. 2 As the American frontier ex-
276. See id In fact, the court explained that statutes that expressly address Native American
tribes is a permissible classification and that such classification has express constitutional provisions





280. See Mark K. Ulmer, The Legal Origin and Nature of Indian Housing Authorities and the
HUD Indian Housing Programs, 13 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 117-19 (1988); cf Vicki J. Limas,
Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: Respecting
Sovereignly and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIz. ST. L. 681 (1994). But see Robert K. Reeve, Did
the North Dakota Supreme Court Properly Decide State v. Hook?, 68 N.D. L. REv. 695 (1992).
281. Cf id. at 540.
282. Cf. COHEN, supra note 6, at 122-24.
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panded farther west, the federal government concluded that the constant
removal of the Native American tribes to new and isolated areas frus-
trated the American policy goal to "civilize" and to facilitate the assimi-
lation of the Native American into mainstream culture.83 This concern, as
well as the constant collision of the American frontier with tribal lands,
prompted the federal government prompted the federal government to
focus not on removal, but on the establishment of fixed, definitive tracts
of land known as reservations, land specifically designated for tribal
use. M
Sensing that Native Americans had not assimilated quickly enough
into the dominant American culture, later in the century, Congress read-
justed its policy of allotment to hasten assimilation.8 The policy of al-
lotment began in the late- nineteenth century and involved doling out
tribal land on American Indian reservations to individual groups of
American Indians or to their families in an attempt to encourage home-
steading and assimilation.' The federal government intensified this ef-
fort after the Civil War,' which culminated in 1887 with the passage of
the General Allotment Act, a statute requiring mandatory allotment of
Native American tribal lands.' Allotment statutes granted land in fee to
Native Americans with some restrictions on alienation.' The govern-
ment began allotting land in trust to the United States for the benefit of
Native Americans toward the end of the century, and the General Allot-
ment Act provided the basis for the present technical definition of the
term allotment."9 After the cession of lands to each eligible Indian fam-
ily, the government either sold or allowed homesteading on the remain-
ing land."' The government abandoned the unsuccessful allotment proc-
ess in the 1930s,' and the definition of the term "allotment" has not
changed significantly in the modern era.' 3
283. See id.
284. See id. at 124. Several of the removal treaties of the nineteenth century allowed Native
American tribes to remain on land ceded by the federal government, which came to be known as
reservations. See id.
285. See id. at 612-13.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 613.
288. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
289. See id.
290. Cf id. Cohen notes that the present meaning for the term "allotment" is based on the 1887
Act. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 615-16.
291. Cf COHEN, supra note 6, at 613-14. After each tribal allotment, the government often
required the "cession" of the remaining tribal land back to the Untied States. See id. at 612-13.
Cohen also suggests that the allotment policy was a not so subtle attempt to appropriate land from
the tribes. See id.
292. See id. at 614.
293. See id. at 615-16. Cohen notes:
allotment is a term of art in Indian law, describing either a parcel of land owned by the
United States in trust for an Indian ("trust" allotment), or owned by an Indian subject to a
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Individual tribal members cannot hold title to land on Native
American reservations; instead, all title to the land rests in the tribe it-
self.2 ' Individuals also have no personal vested interest in tribal prop-
erty." However, tribal members do have privileges and rights to the use
of tribal property, although the rights and use are regulated by tribal law,
policies, and custom.' Tribal membership predicates how and whether
an individual can use the land; withdrawal from the tribe or the loss of
one's membership eliminates a member's right to the use of the land.'
B. Tenth Circuit Case--Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Collier,
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting the
Tribe's motion for summary judgment, holding that a decision by the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) for the Absentee Shawnee Tribe
was "contrary to law."' The parcel in question received the reservation
designation in 1867 in a treaty between the federal government and the
Tribe.' Individual members of the Absentee Shawnee Tribe had already
settled on the land in question, which was later to become the Potawa-
tomi reservation." ' Absentee Shawnee tribal members requested that the
federal government give them title to the land.' In turn, the Potawa-
towmi Tribe agreed to allow the Absentee Shawnees to remain and peti-
tioned the federal government for an expansion of their land that included
and area equivalent to the area occupied by the Absentee Shawnees.' "
To finalize this arrangement, Congress passed an allotment act in
1872 allotting land to each member of the Potawatomi Tribe and to the
Absentee Shawnees living on the Potawatomi's reservation.' In 1890,
the federal government and the Potowatomi Tribe negotiated a treaty
restriction on alienation in favor of the United States or its officials ("restricted fee" al-
lotment).
Id.
294. See id. at 605.
295. See id. at 606.
296. See id. Cohen notes that an American Indian's "right to tribal property is no more than the
prospective and inchoate, unless federal of tribal law recognizes a more definitive right." Id.
297. See id. at 607. Cohen notes that the right is neither inheritable nor assignable. See id at
608.





303. See id. at 1327-28.
304. See Act of May 23, 1872, ch. 206, 17 Stat. 159. The statute also provided for allotments
for the Absentee Shawnees. See id. § 2.
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through which the reservation was ceded to the government.' Several
years later, the Potawatomi Tribe filed a claim against the federal gov-
ernment for additional compensation for surplus land on the reservation.
The government countered this claim and argued that the Tribe had al-
lowed the Absentees Shawnees to remain on the surplus land.' The
Court of Claims rejected the government's claim, noting that the Tribe
had never waived its claim of ownership of the land occupied by the Ab-
sentee Shawnees.'
A century later in 1992, the Potawatomi Tribe learned that the Ab-
sentee Shawnee Tribe had applied to take the lands on which they re-
sided into trust.' The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) determined that the
Potawatomis and the Shawnees commonly shared a reservation and that
the Potawatomi's consent was not necessary to put the lands into trust 09
The Potawatomis sued the Absentee Shawnees and the federal gov-
ermnent to stop the BIA from placing the lands in question into trust."'
The government countered with a motion to dismiss the Potawatomi's
claim for failure to join the Absentee Shawnees as an indispensable party
and for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies."' The district court
granted the government's motion, and the Potawatomi Tribe appealed the
decision. 1
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with the governing statute,
the General Allotment Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire land for Native Americans through "purchase, relinquishment,
gift, exchange or assignment, any interest in lands, within or without
existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments,
whether the allotee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing
land for the indians."' The court defined a reservation as "an area of
land over which the Tribe is recognized by the United States as having
governmental jurisdiction, except that, in the state of Oklahoma... In-
dian reservation means that area of land constituting the former reserva-
tion of the Tribe as defined by the Secretary."3 ' The court also noted that
under federal regulations, a Native American or a Native American tribe
can only "acquire land in trust status on a reservation other than its own"
305. See id. The statute setting out this agreement required that the Potawatomi Tribe surrender
title to the reservation. See id. The Absentee Shawnees also surrendered their land to the govern-
ment. See id.
306. See Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1328-29.






313. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1996)).
314. Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1327 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(0 (1997)).
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when the "governing body of the tribe having jurisdiction over such res-
ervation consents in writing to the acquisition."3 ' For acquisition pur-
poses, Indian consent is not required if the land is already owned in un-
divided trust or restricted interest in land."6
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court to grant
the dismissal.3" On remand, the government renewed its motion, which
was granted by the district court.'" Concurrently, the Interior Board of
Indian Affairs (IBIA) affirmed the decision of the Director of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs."9 The Potawatonis countered this action by filing an
amended claim in district court challenging the IBIA decision."' The gov-
ernment, again, renewed its motions for summary judgment, which the
district court granted.32' On appeal, the defendants claimed that the IBIA's
decision did not receive proper deference.22 The Tenth Circuit held that
the statute did not sever the Potawatomi's treaty right to exclusive use and
occupancy of its reservation. 2 Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the
Secretary of Interior should have obtained the consent of the Potawatomi
Tribe before it could acquire trust lands for the Absentee Shawnees. z'
The court's decision turned on whether the Tenth Circuit must defer
to the IBIA's mandate that the Absentee Shawnee Tribe had a recogniz-
able interest in the Potowatomi lands after June 15, 1890.2 The court
noted that it must determine if the agency's decision contradicted con-
gressional intent." It determined that the Potawatomis presented a com-
pelling argument that IBIA should not receive the Chevron deference
usually accorded to an agency decision because Congress had not dele-




318. See id. at 1330.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id. The district court based its decision on two factors: (1) The Absentee Shawnees
never had a reservation, and (2) The Absentee Shawnees had no interest before 1890, and Congress
did not give any interest to it after the Shawnee surrender of the land. See id. at 1330-31.
322. See id. at 1331.
323. See id. at 1334.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 1332.
326. See id. The court indicated that it had to determine Congressional intent when it ratified
the 1891 statute, the embodiment of the treaties under which reservations lands were given to the
federal government. See id.
327. See id. (comparing the situation in the instant case with the facts and the holding in Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990)). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should give "considerable weight" to an
agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress has given that agency the authority to implement the
statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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explained that it did not need to consider the issue of agency discretion
because the statutory construction of the case indicated that the interpre-
tation and decision of IBIA contradicted statutory intent.2
3
The court held that the Tribe did not obtain rights in the Potawatomi
reservation between June 5, 1890 and the 1891 statute. 32 The court re-
jected the defendant's claim that the district court failed to give the IBIA
decision proper deference.3 Noting that Congress has the right to abro-
gate treaty rights, the court found that the statutory language must be
express.' Ultimately, the court decided that the legislative history and
the historical ramifications of the Act did not create clear congressional
intent to breach the Potawatomi's treaty right to the exclusive use and
331occupancy of its former reservation.
D. Analysis
Again, as with tribal membership, the Tenth Circuit has remained
consistent with recent American legislative and judicial policy regarding
Native American self-determination. In this instance, the court retained
the balance of power between the federal agency, in this case the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and the tribe's right of self-determination. The court of
appeals followed historical precedent to find in favor of the tribe, unless
Congress had specifically stated limitations of tribal authority in the stat-
ute. The court deferred to tribal sovereignty because of the lack of ex-
press intent in the statute to limit the authority of the Potawatomi Tribe.3
As with Indian trust lands, the court focused completely on the express
language in the statute in rendering its decision, and maintained tribal
sovereignty in this instance. Because of the vagaries of the treaty and
the fact that Native American tribes have almost absolute sovereignty
within the confines of their reservations, the federal courts did not (and
should not) involve themselves in the matter.
This is true unless the agency's decision unless the agency's decision violates express Congressional
intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
328. See Citizen Band, 142 F.3d at 1332.
329. See id. at 1331-32.
330. See id. at 1332.
331. See id. at 1332-33.
332. See id. at 1333-34.
333. See Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule of Abso-
lute Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 AZ. ST. LJ. 987,991 (1994); cf.
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 1-7 (1995). But see Darby L. Hog-
gat, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit Act: Enforcing Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND &
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CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit addressing Indian disputes in the
past year demonstrate a consistency with past precedents and public pol-
icy concerns of allowing and encouraging Native American tribes to en-
gage in self determination and self government. Tenth Circuit precedent
dictates that if events occur on Indian lands and involve other Indians,
that the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over such events. Indeed, if Na-
tive Americans engage in transactions and associations with non-Indians,
the courts have granted deference to the tribes, unless the tribe has ac-
tively and expressly acted to avail itself to the jurisdiction of a federal
court. The majority of the decisions discussed in this analysis, including
tribal membership, Indian trust lands, and sovereign immunity suggest
and reinforce the notion that the federal government, and specifically the
judiciary, has a policy of deference to the self-governance of Native
American tribes. The courts, however, have not extended the same defer-
ence in the adjudication of disputes involving the now defunct Indian
Gaming and Regulatory Act. The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe has gutted the statute in the area of initiating and developing gam-
bling facilities on their reservations. The tribes now remain at the mercy
of the individual states in which their respective reservations are situated.
The history, culture, and present situation of the Native Americans
and their reservations will continue to present difficult judicial, legisla-
tive, and policy problems for the American political and judicial systems.
The lines that divide the exact authority of Native American tribes and
that of the states and the federal government are imprecise and subject to
the whims of politics, as the creation of IGRA and the Supreme Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe indicates. Consequently, the American gov-
ernment still struggles to walk the tightrope between self-determination
for the Native Americans and benevolent paternalism.
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